The Intellectual Foundations and Consequences of the Taliban’s Cultural and Educational Policies in Afghanistan: From Religious Schools to the Ban on Music and Restrictions on Cultural Heritage
The
Intellectual Foundations and Consequences of the Taliban’s Cultural and
Educational Policies in Afghanistan: From Religious Schools to the Ban on Music
and Restrictions on Cultural Heritage
ORCID: 0009-0004-0024-1223
Author:
Professor Islamuddin
Firoz Former Professor, Department of Music, Faculty of Fine Arts, Kabul
University
Abstract
The
Taliban are a political-religious phenomenon whose intellectual and
organizational roots can be traced to the environment of religious schools in
southern Afghanistan and the Pashtun-populated regions of Pakistan,
particularly the Deobandi tradition. By linking political power to a strict
interpretation of Sharia, this movement has placed many areas of social,
cultural, educational, and artistic life under ideological supervision. Within
this system, concepts such as halal and haram and the leader’s decrees serve as
the basis for policymaking not only in matters of worship, but also in
education, women’s employment, music, traditional celebrations, and cultural
heritage. The prohibition of women’s education and employment, restrictions on
Nowruz, and extensive limitations on music and musical instruments have had
consequences extending beyond the individual sphere, weakening Afghanistan’s
human capital, cultural diversity, and social cohesion. Adopting a
historical-analytical approach, this article demonstrates that the continuation
of such policies could lead to cultural isolation, human-capital flight,
economic deterioration, the spread of extremism, and increased social pressures
in Afghanistan and the region. The perspectives of thinkers from both the East
and the West are also employed to examine the relationship among religion,
culture, art, education, and political power.
Keywords: Taliban, religious schools,
fundamentalism, Sharia, halal and haram, women, education, music, Nowruz,
cultural heritage, Afghanistan.
Introduction
The
political developments in Afghanistan over the past four decades have shown
that the conflict in the country has not merely been a struggle over political
power or geographical territory; it has always been intertwined with profound
questions concerning identity, religion, culture, education, and people’s ways
of life. The emergence of the Taliban in the 1990s and their return to power in
2021 once again placed these issues at the center of attention. The Taliban
present themselves as an Islamic movement seeking to establish an “Islamic
Emirate,” yet their interpretation and implementation of Sharia, particularly
in the areas of women’s rights, education, art, and culture, have faced
widespread criticism both domestically and internationally.
The
importance of examining the Taliban’s cultural policies stems from the fact
that culture is not merely a collection of forms of entertainment or social
customs; it embodies historical memory, collective identity, and the ways in
which generations communicate with one another. When education, music,
traditional celebrations, and women’s social activities are restricted, parts
of the mechanisms through which a society produces and transmits its identity
are, in effect, transformed. Therefore, understanding the Taliban’s policies
requires a simultaneous examination of the roots of religious schools,
fundamentalism, the relationship between religion and politics, the concepts of
halal and haram, and the social and regional consequences of these policies.
The
Taliban and religious schools cannot be considered separately from one another.
Even the name “Taliban” originally refers to “students” or students of
religious sciences. The movement developed in the 1990s within an environment
in which religious schools played an important role in educating a significant
portion of religious and political forces. A considerable number of the
Taliban’s early leaders also received their religious education in schools in
Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Deobandi intellectual tradition, alongside local,
tribal, and political elements, influenced the formation of the Taliban’s
worldview; however, neither all followers of the Deobandi school nor all
religious schools should be equated with the Taliban.
Historically,
religious schools in Muslim societies were not merely places for teaching
religious rulings. Many traditional schools also taught language sciences,
logic, philosophy, history, and literature. Therefore, the fundamental problem
cannot be reduced to “religious education” itself; the problem emerges when a
limited and unquestionable interpretation of religion replaces dialogue and
intellectual pluralism and is then imposed upon the entire society through the
state and instruments of social coercion.
Within
this framework, religious fundamentalism can be understood as an attempt to
return society to an idealized model of the past—a model that generally leaves
little clear distinction among religion, morality, politics, and everyday life.
Under the Taliban system, many political and social decisions are justified
through concepts such as “halal,” “haram,” “permissible,” and “impermissible.”
The problem arises when these concepts are not applied through the processes of
ijtihad and scholarly dialogue, but instead are enforced as governmental
directives and political orders. Under such circumstances, the question “Why?”
gives way to the question “Has it been ordered or not?”
The
leader’s decree occupies a special position within the Taliban’s political
structure. Political power and religious authority are concentrated in the
person of the Taliban’s supreme leader, and this concentration causes cultural
and social decisions to be transmitted from the top down. In such a system, the
boundary between a religious ruling, public policy, and an executive order can
become extremely narrow. From the perspective of political science, this issue
is highly significant, because when a political authority considers itself the
possessor of the final interpretation of religious truth, the possibility of
criticizing and reforming policies is reduced.
This
situation can also be compared with the thought of Abu al-Hasan Ibn Khaldun. In
his analysis of civilization, Ibn Khaldun associated the development of
sciences, industries, and the arts with security, prosperity, and social
organization. Civilization flourishes when human beings have the opportunity to
produce intellectual and artistic work. From this perspective, restricting
education and culture does not merely restrict individuals; it reduces the
civilizational capacity of society as a whole.
In
the Western philosophical tradition, John Stuart Mill likewise emphasized the
importance of freedom of thought and individuality, arguing that society
progresses when people are able to experience and express different viewpoints.
Even if a particular view is incorrect, preventing its expression can deprive
society of the opportunity to correct its mistakes. This perspective is
particularly relevant to Afghanistan, because prohibiting or restricting
education, art, and cultural expression can deprive society of the diversity of
experiences necessary for rebuilding the country.
One
of the most visible manifestations of Taliban policy is the severe restrictions
imposed on women. The prohibition or restriction of girls’ and women’s
education and the prevention of their broad participation in the labor market
are not merely matters of individual rights; they have direct economic and
social consequences. A society that excludes half of its population from higher
education, skilled employment, and public participation loses a substantial
portion of its human capital. International organizations have also repeatedly
warned about the consequences of these policies.
At
the social level, depriving women of employment and education increases
economic dependency, reduces household income, intensifies poverty, and limits
society’s access to female professionals. This issue is particularly important
in fields such as medicine and education, because in a conservative society
such as Afghanistan, women’s and girls’ access to female doctors, teachers, and
specialists carries considerable cultural and social importance. If the new
generation of girls is prevented from receiving education, the main
consequences of this decision may emerge years later in the form of shortages
of doctors, teachers, researchers, and specialists.
This
policy can also be criticized from the perspective of political philosophy.
Aristotle regarded human beings as social and political beings and considered
participation in public life to be part of the realization of human potential.
From this perspective, depriving a large portion of society of the opportunity
to participate is not merely the removal of a political right; it is a
restriction on the development of human capacities. On the other hand, Kant
emphasized human dignity and autonomy, meaning that human beings should not be
treated merely as means for achieving the objectives of others. A policy that
broadly deprives individuals of fundamental choices concerning education and
social life conflicts with this conception of autonomy.
Another
issue is the Taliban’s treatment of traditional celebrations such as Nowruz.
For millions of people in Afghanistan, Nowruz is not merely a celebration; it
is part of the region’s historical and cultural memory, with roots extending to
ancient Iranian and Central Asian traditions. Opposition to Nowruz can be
viewed as an example of an attempt to define society’s cultural identity
according to ideological criteria. Here, the central issue is not merely
opposition to a particular ceremony; rather, it is whether a government can
remove a historical tradition from the public sphere because of its particular
interpretation of religion.
From
a cultural perspective, Nowruz is an important example of historical
continuity. Many pre-Islamic cultural elements have survived for centuries
within Muslim societies and have even become intertwined with Islamic culture.
Therefore, the history of Islamic culture cannot be reduced to a single period
or a single source. The culture of Afghanistan itself is the product of
interactions among Aryan, Khorasani, ethnic, and local traditions. Eliminating
part of this diversity could lead to the weakening of Afghanistan’s
multilayered identity.
The
same issue applies to music. The Taliban have banned or restricted music in
many of its forms, and in some cases have also taken action against musical
instruments. This policy existed during the Taliban’s first period of rule and,
following their return to power, similar restrictions were again expanded.
Music, however, is not merely a means of entertainment; in many societies, it
carries historical memory, language, ritual, narratives of love, mourning, joy,
and ethnic identity.
Musical
instruments are likewise part of a nation’s tangible and intangible cultural
heritage. The rubab, dambura, tabla, and many other traditional Afghan
instruments are not merely tools for producing sound; they carry social
history. When a musician is prevented from playing an instrument, part of the
chain through which musical knowledge is transmitted is also severed. The
master no longer trains students; the instrument maker loses their market;
musical archives decline; and the younger generation becomes increasingly
distant from the musical experiences of previous generations.
In
this context, the perspective of Abu Nasr al-Farabi is significant. Al-Farabi
regarded music as an organized field of knowledge and discussed the effects of
sounds and melodies on human states and emotions. Thus, within the Islamic
philosophical tradition as well, music was not necessarily regarded as a
worthless or merely entertaining phenomenon. Of course, al-Farabi’s perspective
is not identical to the Taliban’s cultural policy, but the existence of such a
philosophical tradition demonstrates that the history of Islamic thought has
been far more diverse than a single interpretation of art.
On
the other hand, Nietzsche famously stated: “Life without music would be a
mistake.” Regardless of philosophical differences, this statement points to the
fundamental role of art in human experience. Music can create a sense of social
belonging and build shared experiences. In Afghanistan, where decades of war
and migration have created deep social divisions, art can be one of the
instruments for rebuilding social bonds.
The
prohibition of music also has economic consequences. Musicians, instrument
makers, event organizers, producers of audio works, and owners of cultural
venues all constitute parts of the cultural economy. Severe restrictions can
destroy this chain, causing young talents either to leave the country or to
abandon artistic activity. In the long term, the result is not merely less
music; it is also a decline in cultural diversity and the erosion of intangible
heritage.
The
Taliban’s historical experience regarding cultural heritage also demonstrates
how an ideological outlook can place material remains of the past at risk. The
destruction of the Bamiyan Buddha statues in 2001 is one of the most prominent
examples of this approach. The incident demonstrated that if a historical
artifact is evaluated solely on the basis of religious or ideological
affiliation, its historical and civilizational value may be disregarded.
Cultural heritage, however, does not belong exclusively to a particular
religious period or ethnic group; it is part of the shared memory of humanity.
From
the perspective of UNESCO, both tangible and intangible cultural heritage are
important in transmitting identity and knowledge across generations. Therefore,
protecting music, rituals, languages, architecture, handicrafts, and historical
monuments does not mean endorsing all beliefs that existed in the past; rather,
it means preserving the possibility of understanding the past. A society that
destroys its past also loses the possibility of engaging critically with it.
Here,
the distinction between “religion” and “religious political ideology” becomes
important. Religion can encompass broad domains of ethics, spirituality,
worship, and meaning, whereas ideology seeks to transform particular principles
into a program of governance. When a government claims that its interpretation
of halal and haram is the only valid interpretation, political opposition can
easily be interpreted as religious opposition. This restricts the space for
criticism and dialogue.
In
fact, one of the most important consequences of a system based on strict
commands is the reduction of the possibility of ijtihad and pluralism.
Throughout Islamic history, multiple schools of jurisprudence have emerged, and
differences of opinion among religious scholars have been widely recognized.
Even within traditional jurisprudence, many social issues have been discussed
according to their temporal and geographical circumstances. Reducing all this
complexity to a set of absolute commands can diminish the dynamism of religious
thought.
The
continuation of such policies within Afghanistan could have long-term
consequences. First, the gap between the government and segments of society
would increase. Second, a young generation deprived of education, art, and
social opportunities may feel increasingly alienated from the political
structure. Third, the brain drain would intensify. Students, professors,
physicians, artists, and specialists who see their professional futures as
increasingly constrained within the country are likely to consider migration.
Fourth, Afghanistan’s economy, which is heavily dependent on foreign aid and
limited domestic activity, would suffer from the decline in human capital.
At
the regional level, the consequences are also significant. Afghanistan shares
borders or social and cultural connections with Pakistan, Iran, Tajikistan,
Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and China. The continuation of extremism could affect
border security, migration, trafficking, public opinion, and regional armed
groups. If the Taliban’s model of governance is perceived as a successful
example of combining religious authority with political power, some extremist
movements in the region may draw inspiration from it, although the social and
political conditions of each country are different.
From
a futures-studies perspective, the fundamental question is whether the Taliban
can establish a balance between their religious interpretation and the needs of
a modern society. Afghanistan needs doctors, engineers, teachers, researchers,
artists, and entrepreneurs for reconstruction. No country can achieve
sustainable development by excluding a large portion of its human resources.
Likewise, a society that restricts its art and heritage loses part of its soft
power.
Therefore,
Afghanistan’s future depends to a considerable extent on how the government
defines the relationship among religion, the state, and society. If religion is
regarded as a source of ethics and spirituality alongside cultural pluralism
and social rights, it can become part of society’s social capital. But if a
political interpretation of religion becomes an instrument for eliminating
differences, the likely result will be declining social trust and increasing
isolation. Historical experience shows that civilizations have flourished when
dialogue has existed among tradition and innovation, religion and reason,
identity and pluralism, and the past and the future.
Conclusion
The
Taliban’s cultural and educational policies cannot be regarded as a collection
of isolated decisions concerning schools, women, music, Nowruz, or art; these
policies are part of a broader and more coherent conception of the relationship
among religion, the state, society, and the individual. The Taliban’s
historical connection with religious schools and the Deobandi tradition,
together with the political, ethnic, and historical elements of Afghanistan,
provided a context for the formation of their worldview. However, a distinction
must be made between “religious education” and “fundamentalist government.”
Religious schools throughout Islamic history have never been homogeneous, and
many Islamic scholarly traditions have been based on dialogue, ijtihad,
philosophy, logic, and intellectual pluralism.
The
central problem in the Taliban’s policies becomes evident when concepts such as
halal and haram are transformed from matters of scholarly and jurisprudential
debate into instruments of governmental command. Under such circumstances, the
leader’s decree can directly affect education, employment, art, and culture
while reducing the possibility of criticizing policy. Restrictions on women’s
education and employment are among the most costly of these policies, because
they not only limit individual rights and freedoms but also reduce
Afghanistan’s human capital and economic capacity.
The
prohibition or restriction of Nowruz and music likewise has consequences
extending beyond a religious disagreement. Such policies can weaken
Afghanistan’s cultural memory and intangible heritage. Instruments such as the
rubab and dambura, local music, traditional rituals, and historical
celebrations are all part of Afghanistan’s multilayered history. Their
elimination means the elimination of part of society’s historical narrative.
Looking
toward the future, the continuation of this system could intensify cultural
isolation, the migration of educated elites, the reduction of economic
opportunities, the erosion of social capital, and the widening gap between the
younger generation and the authorities. At the regional level, such a situation
could also affect migration, security, and extremist movements. Therefore,
Afghanistan’s sustainable future requires recognition of the fact that
religion, culture, and tradition can play a constructive role when they exist
alongside education, freedom of thought, social participation, and the
preservation of historical heritage. A society that preserves its past while
also maintaining the possibility of questioning it will have a greater chance
of building a stable and humane future.
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